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Abstract 
This paper is an empirical study of the effect of shocks to firms' collateral, with a focus 
on land holdings. We find evidence that stand-alone French firms are credit 
constrained. They invest up to .39€ more per extra euro of collateral, and they finance 
this additional investment by issuing more debt. This result is obtained by looking at 
the specific case of the Ile de France real estate bubble of the 90s, which we use as a 
natural experiment providing exogenous variations in land value. Consistent with the 
view of efficient internal capital markets, we find that the effect collateral on corporate 
investment is limited to stand-alone firms. 
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Valeur du collatéral et investissement des entreprises 




Ce texte propose une étude empirique des effets de chocs sur la valeur du collatéral 
des entreprises, avec un accent sur la détention de terrains. On met en évidence une 
contrainte de crédit sur les entreprises individuelles françaises. Elles accroissent leur 
investissement de 0,39 par euro supplémentaire de collatéral et elles financent ce 
surcroît d’investissement par émission de dette. Ces résultats découlent de l’examen 
des effets de la bulle immobilière qui a concerné la région Ile de France durant les 
années 1990. Cette bulle fournit une expérience naturelle de choc exogène sur la 
valeur du patrimoine foncier des entreprises. L’analyse empirique confirme aussi 
l’hypothèse d’efficience des marchés internes de capitaux : on trouve en effet que cet 
impact du collatéral ne concerne que les entreprises indépendantes.  
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Practitioners have long recognized how a bubble in the value of a tangible asset, such as real
estate, can deeply impact the way ﬁrms obtain ﬁnancing. In the early 90s, many observers at-
tributed the successful Japanese expansion into foreign markets to their increased debt capacity,
fueled by domestic real estate hyper-inﬂation. Cutts (1990), in the Harvard Business Review,
pointed out that, “to corporations, the appeal of the quickly inﬂating asset values was that banks
were eager to lend against the land as collateral at 80% or more of “fair market value”, turning
themselves into “fountainheads of corporate credit that grew along with the speculative value of
land - whether sold or unsold”. Inspired by the striking scale of the Japanese bubble, economic
theorists, such as Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), build up on the tradition of the asymmetric in-
formation literature a la Barro (1976) and Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) to design models, either
with moral hazard or adverse selection issues, emphasizing the role of collateral in enhancing a
ﬁrm’s ability to issue debt and, subsequently, to invest. Despite this important theoretical liter-
ature, there is still only scant evidence on the role that collateral plays in determining corporate
investment.
This paper, along with a companion paper focusing on the U.S. case (Chaney et al. (2006)),
is an attempt to ﬁll this gap. We empirically study the eﬀect of shocks to ﬁrms’ collateral,
with a focus on land holdings. We ﬁnd evidence that French ﬁrms are credit constrained and
invest, on average, ¿.24 more per extra euro of collateral: this additional investment is ﬁnanced
through the issue of new debt, which leads to an increase in ﬁnancial leverage. Consistent with
this evidence of credit constraints, we ﬁnd that this sensitivity of investment to land holding is
mostly concentrated upon stand-alone ﬁrms: for these stand-alone companies, an extra euro of
collateral can increase investment up to ¿.39. On the opposite, investment in ﬁrms belonging
to a business group do not seem to react to increased land holding value, which we interpret
as evidence of eﬃcient internal capital markets. Finally, we investigate the question of ﬁrms’
performance and ﬁnd that proﬁtability measure such as returns on assets or operating margin
increase when land holding values inﬂate, a result conﬁrming the extent of credit constraints
among French ﬁrms.
We believe these results are important, at least for two reasons. The ﬁrst implication is
positive: it suggests that large, exogenous shifts in the value of corporate equity - land in this
case - have sizeable eﬀects on corporate demand for equipment goods. More precisely, by focusing
on the bust of the real estate bubble that aﬀected the Paris area in the 90s, this paper documents
how a sharp decline in the asset market aﬀects corporate investment decisions and therefore the
whole business cycle. This “corporate wealth eﬀect” we point out, similar to the wealth eﬀect ﬁrst
observed for households in the life-cycle literature (beginning with Ando and Modigliani (1963)),
might explain how purely ﬁnancial shocks generate persistent macroeconomic ﬂuctuations, as
argued in the macroeconomic literature since at least Bernanke and Gertler (1988). This paper
thus uncovers the micro foundations behind such a macroeconomic model in a precise manner.
The second implication of our analysis is normative. As positive shocks to land value alleviate
ﬁnancing constraints, holding real estate on the balance sheet may provide a useful corporate
hedging mechanism against liquidity shocks. Following up on Holmstrom and Tirole (2000,
2001) analysis of liquidity, our empirical study conﬁrms that ﬁrms whose liquidity needs are
correlated with the real estate cycle should beneﬁt more from holding real estate assets on their
balance sheets. We believe that this hedging perspective should be taken into accounts when
4ﬁrms decide upon renting or buying their real estate properties.
As can be noticed from a single glance at ﬁgure 1, France experienced in the 90’s a major
asymmetric shock on the value of real estate: land prices in the Ile de France region - the area
surrounding Paris - experienced, between 1988 and 1992, a 60% increase, while prices in other
regions of France (, i.e. the province areas) were only inﬂating by some 20%. In the next three
years, Ile de France’s real estate prices declined by more than 30 %, while prices in province
remained smoothly increasing. During the same period, as shown in ﬁgure 2, local GDPs or
income growth were fairly similar, suggesting that the shock aﬀecting real estate prices in Ile
de France was fairly idiosyncratic to the real estate market. This shock thus provides us with a
perfect setting to look at the impact of collateral values on corporate investment. Our empirical
strategy rests on computing triple diﬀerences. We look at investment in Ile de France and
Province. Within each location, we compare the evolution of investment behavior, between the
peak and the bust of the bubble, for ﬁrms who own land and ﬁrms who do not. The diﬀerences
(among these regions, ﬁrms and periods) measure the causal eﬀect of a collateral shock on
investment strategy, as the comparison between land holding and non land holding ﬁrms within
a same region allows us to control for local demand shocks.
Our focus on real estate is ﬁrst motivated by the commonly use of land as a source of collateral,
either in developed (Davydenko and Franks (2005)) or in developing economies (World Bank
Survey (2005)). Besides, as we previously argued, the land price shock observed in Ile de France
appears quite exogenous to investment opportunities, at least for ﬁrms outside the ﬁnance,
insurance, construction and real estate industries. Land price variations, such as those implied
by the 90s bubble, thus provides us with a very natural source of variation in collateral value,
although we believe that our analysis extends to other forms of capital, like foreign exchange
denominated securities, or even trade credit.
Nevertheless, one may still argue that we lose a lot of information by pooling together diﬀerent
regions in province, which may have experienced diﬀerent land inﬂation. To address this issue,
we use the methodology developed in our companion paper, Chaney et al. (2006), and look
more generally at the elasticity of corporate investment to local land prices variations, using
a dataset which provides regional housing prices since 1985. This allows to use ﬁner price
evolution diﬀerentials as a source of identiﬁcation. More precisely, we compare the evolution of
the elasticity of investment to land prices, for land holding and non land holding ﬁrms, and in
region with above and below average housing price inﬂation.
Leaning on this strategy, we ﬁrst report robust causal evidence that real estate inﬂation has
a positive and signiﬁcant impact on the investment behavior. The magnitude of this eﬀect is not
negligible. Overall, we ﬁnd that when real estate prices increase by one standard deviation, ﬁrms
with signiﬁcant real estate ownership experience, relative to ﬁrms with no real estate assets, a
12% standard-deviation increase in their level of capital expenditures. Put another way, ﬁrms
invest ¿.24 more per additional euro of collateral, other things equal. An interesting feature of
the French economy, compared to the U.S. environment, is that many ﬁrms belong to a business
group. The literature has traditionally emphasized how internal capital markets in such groups
sheltered companies from credit constraints (see Schoar (2002)). When restricting attention to
stand-alone ﬁrms, i.e. ﬁrms not aﬃliated to a business group, we ﬁnd that the sensitivity of
investment to collateral can rise up to ¿.39. We interpret this result as evidence of groups’
5eﬃciency regarding investment policies. Overall, the eﬀect we highlight in this paper is large
compared to the existing literature. Investment to cash ﬂow sensitivity coeﬃcients typically give
an additional ¿.10 investment per extra euro of cash, whereas Rauh (2006) ﬁnds a decrease of
$0.60-$0.70 in investment per dollar of mandatory contributions. Arguably, real estate assets
are less liquid than cash. Still, it appears that ﬁrms are able to make use of such collateral to
generate additional investments.
We ﬁnally investigate the channel through which the increase in land holding value is con-
verted into increased investment. We ﬁnd that ﬁrms with signiﬁcant land holdings in regions
with increased real estate prices signiﬁcantly modify their capital structure. They do so essen-
tially by issuing new debts and increasing their ﬁnancial leverage. To give an order of magnitude,
we ﬁnd that for stand-alone ﬁrms, a ¿1 increase in land holding increase by ¿.78 their debt
issue, conditionally on issuing debt.
While most of the existing theory relates investment to debt capacity, and debt capacity
to collateral, the empirical literature has sought to show the eﬀect of cash ﬂows on investment
(Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988)). As cash ﬂows are also a measure of proﬁtability, recent
papers identify cash ﬂows shocks that are orthogonal to investment opportunies (Blanchard,
Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (1994), Lamont (1997), Rauh (2006)). Closer to the present
paper, Almeida, Campello and Weisbach (2003) have focused on the role of cash holdings. They
show that credit constrained ﬁrms tend to store cash on their balance sheet to avoid forgoing
valuable investment opportunities in the future.
Rather than looking at cash (ﬂows or stock), we focus on exogenous ﬂuctuations in the value
of collateral, in a large panel of ﬁrms. To our knowledge, the only existing papers on collateral
shocks are Peek and Rosengreen (2000), Goyal and Yamada (2001) and Gan (2006). These
contributions focus on corporate investment in the speciﬁc context of the 1980s Japanese real
estate bubble. Peek and Rosengreen (2000) are interested in the supply side of ﬁnance, i.e. they
look at the implied deterioration of Japanese Banks balance sheet on the supply of credit, a focus
quite diﬀerent from ours. Goyal and Yamada (2001) and Gan (2006), the closest contributions
to this present paper, look at the impact of the Japanese bubble on corporate investment,
diﬀerentiating between land holding and non land holding corporations. An important concern
with these papers is that the shock to land prices they study is mainly a national shock, which
may seriously aﬀect their identiﬁcation strategy. Our paper focus on French data, a country
with a somewhat diﬀerent corporate structure, and uses a more stringent identifying strategy -
triple, instead of double, diﬀerences.
In addition, as in our companion paper Chaney et al. (2006) on US corporations, we make use
of our focus on collateral to investigate the eﬀect of corporate wealth shocks on capital structure.
Our results complement the ﬁndings of Benmelech, Garmaise and Moskowitz (2005) that more
liquid assets (or more ”redeployable” assets) are ﬁnanced with loans of longer maturities and
durations, as well as lower interest rates.
The rest of the paper is structured as followed. Section 2 presents the construction of the
data as well as some summary statistics. Section 3 provides ﬁrst results using the Ile de France
land price bubble as a natural experiment on collateral value. Section 4 presents the results
on corporate investment using the more general identiﬁcation strategy and section 5 details the
6ﬁndings on capital structure. Section 6 concludes.
2 Data
We use accounting data of French ﬁrms, merged with real estate prices measured at the level of
the region.
2.1 Accounting Data
The ﬁrm-level data sets used in this study are based on accounting information available for all
French ﬁrms, public or private, whose annual sales exceed 100,000 Euros in the service sector
and 200,000 Euros in other sectors (the BRN ﬁle or “Fichier des B´ en´ eﬁces R´ eels Normaux”).
These accounting data are extracted, since 1984, from the tax ﬁles used by the Ministry of
Finance for corporate tax collection purposes. French ﬁrms above these thresholds are required
by tax authorities to ﬁll in a detailed balance sheet and proﬁt statement. Individual ﬁrms can
be tracked over time by the use of a unique identiﬁer, which allows for the construction of a
panel data set.
We restrict the BRN sample to ﬁrms with more than 20 employees and ﬁrms that have
accounting data for each year between 1984 and 1998. Both restrictions allows to work with a
data set of usable size. Of course, these choices are likely to introduce bias in the sample, but it
is crucial to note that both restrictions are more likely to make us under-estimate the impact of
collateral on investment1. Indeed, it is well known in the corporate ﬁnance literature (Kaplan
and Zingales (1998) for instance) that small ﬁrms experience more credit constraints that large
ﬁrms. Moreover, distressed ﬁrms are also likely to have less access to ﬁnancing, and therefore
should rely more on collateralized debt to obtain funds.
We also excluded from the sample all ﬁrms in the ﬁnance, insurance, real estate or construc-
tion industry. Finance and Insurance ﬁrms were taken out because their accounting data cannot
be easily compared with other industries’ data. Real estate and construction ﬁrms were likely to
have investment opportunities strongly tied to the real estate cycle, leading us to exclude them
from the sample.
All these restrictions leave us with a sample of 11,975 ﬁrms from 1987 to 1998, spanning
a large period in times. The BRN ﬁle contains an item indicating a ﬁrm’s region of location,
i.e. the region where the ﬁrm is likely to hold its real estate assets. Instead of relying on this
information, we merged the BRN ﬁle with the REPERE ﬁle, a ﬁle detailing the location and
number of plants for all French ﬁrms. We used as region of location the region of the plant with
the largest number of employee. As it turns out, among our 11,975 ﬁrms, 72% (8,676 ﬁrms)
are ﬁrms with one establishment, i.e. ﬁrms for which there is no doubt regarding the location.
Moreover, for the 3,299 ﬁrms with more than one establishment, the second establishment has,
on average, only 17% of the largest establishment employees. Therefore, one can be conﬁdent
that the main part of a corporation’s real estate holding are likely to be in the region of the
1We checked that the main results of the paper were not aﬀected by any of this choices ; as expected, the
measured eﬀects of collateral on investment were even stronger when using the unbalanced panel
7largest establishment. Nevertheless, all the results exposed in this paper remains unchanged
when we use the mono-establishment panel.
2.2 Land Holding Data
As mentioned in the introduction, our identiﬁcation strategy relies on comparing ﬁrms with
land holding and ﬁrms with no land holding. Land holding of a company is given by the item
“Terrain” on the BRN ﬁle, which can be found in the detailed description of a corporation’s
assets. A particularly convenient aspect of this item is that a law was passed in 1980 forcing all
French ﬁrms to re-evaluate their real estate holding at “fair”-market value. Therefore, looking
at land values in 1987, i.e. just before the burst of the bubble, should provide us with a measure
of land holding not too aﬀected by the date at which a ﬁrm acquired its property (since real
estate inﬂation was fairly moderate and constant across regions between 1980 and 1987).
Land is not a massive part of ﬁrms’ total asset. We ﬁnd that among our sample of ﬁrms, 49%
of them did report positive terrain in 1987. For those ﬁrms, land holdings were accounting for
about 4% of total assets. Table 1 provides summary statistics for the main accounting variable
we use in the paper.
2.3 Real Estate Data
Data for real estate prices come from the Statistical Oﬃce of the Equipment Ministry2 and
consists in the observed average transaction prices for new individual housing. The data set
exists yearly since 1985 and gives prices at the region-level.
We use private household price data rather than commercial real estate data for two reasons.
First and foremost, these are the only data freely available over such a period of time and at such
a level of disaggregation. However, real estate property is a relatively homogeneous good, which
makes private single-family a good proxy for real estate. Second, having in mind endogeneity
issues, we are concerned about a potential correlation between local real estate prices and local
business conditions that may aﬀect the proﬁtability of investment. In that respect, private
single-family house prices are a priori less correlated with local investment opportunities, than
commercial real estate.
We normalize housing prices to 1 in 1987 for each region in France and use this price index
as our measure for land prices. The average price index in the sample is 1.31, and its standard
deviation amounts to .25.
3 Using the Ile de France Bubble as a Natural Experiment
Our ﬁrst identiﬁcation strategy is very close to that used in Gan (2006), except that we also
use cross-regional variations in housing price. As noted from ﬁgure 1, the Ile de France region
2The data can be downloaded from the web on the following web site: http://www.statistiques.equipement.
gouv.fr/IMG/xls/Ecln3RD4t05 cle6174dd.xls.
8experienced, between 1992 and 1995 and relative to the rest of France, a sharp 35% decline in
real estate prices. Our identiﬁcation strategy tries to take advantage of the bust of the bubble.
More precisely, we wish to compare how land holding ﬁrms in Paris adapted their investment
behavior through the bust of the bubble compare to (1) non-land holding ﬁrms also located
in Ile de France, and therefore experiencing the same local shocks and (2) land holding ﬁrms
located in province, these ﬁrms exhibiting a priori the same speciﬁc characteristics common to
land holding ﬁrms.
This can be simply done by estimating a long diﬀerence equation such as:
∆(Inv)i,1992−1995 = α + βLANDi,1992 + γIle de Francei (1)
+δLANDi,1992 × Ile de Francei + ν∆(Cash) + µXi + i,
where ∆ is the long diﬀerence operator (i.e. the operator that makes the diﬀerence of a variable
between 1995 and 1992), INV is a ratio of investment to total assets, Cash is the ratio of
operating cash ﬂows to total assets, X is a set of ﬁrm-level control variables, Ile de Francei is a
dummy indicating whether the ﬁrm is located in Ile de France3 and Landi,1992 is the ratio of
terrain to total assets in 1992.
In equation 2, δ provides us with a measure of the impact of collateral value on ﬁrm invest-
ment. It is indeed identiﬁed by looking at the diﬀerential elasticity of increase in investment to
increase in price for land holding ﬁrms in Ile de France, land holding ﬁrms in province, and non
land holding ﬁrms in all region of France.
There are two potential concerns in using equation 2 directly and both are related to the
endogeneity of the land holding variable LAND1992. First, there is a simultaneity issue. Assume
that the ﬁrms that like to speculate on the real estate market are also the ﬁrms that covary
the most with the real estate market. In this case, large land holding in Paris in 1992 would
be the result of the land price increase between 1989 and 1992, which would in turn reﬂects a
large covariation with the real estate cycle. We would therefore observe that the ﬁrms holding
land in Ile de France in 1992 sharply decrease their investment with the bust of the bubble,
but this would not reﬂect their lower debt capacity but only the fact that they co-variate more
with real estate prices. To address such an issue, a potential solution is to use the beginning
of period land holding (i.e. LAND1987,0) as a proxy for current land holding. Such a proxy
is not aﬀected by current decisions on real estate acquisitions and, given the stickiness of land
ownership, predicts very well the amount of land holding that could be pledged to an outside
investor between 1992 and 1995.
If using land holding in 1987 as a proxy for land holding in 1992 is a natural way to circumvent
the simultaneity issue, another endogeneity problem may still be plaguing equation (2). It could
well be that some ﬁrm characteristics, such as size or industry, are correlated with both initial
real estate assets (for instance, large ﬁrms are more likely to own land in 1987) and covariance
with the business cycle (large ﬁrms are less pro-cyclical, and therefore their investment co-varies
less with the real estate market). In such a case, the δ coeﬃcient would be misleading as it
would also capture the eﬀect of these characteristics on the pro-cyclicality of ﬁrms’ investment.
3Note that, by deﬁnition of our location variable, all ﬁrms are location in the same region in all the year of
the sample, which is why there is no time subscript in the Ile de France variable.
9To alleviate part of the problem, we therefore regress the initial land holding variable LAND1987
on its economic determinants - such as size or industry - and use the residual of this equation as
a measure of “abnormal” land holding conditional on a corporation observable characteristics
(we label this variable ABLAND1987). The co-variates of land ownership are close to those used
by Sharpe and Nguyen (1995) in their study of the share of leased capital by corporations. We
include two-digit industry dummies, as well as a measure of ﬁrm size (log of total assets), ﬁrm
proﬁtability, and a dummy indicating whether the ﬁrm belongs to a business group4. We further
include ﬁnancial leverage and region of headquarter location dummies. These last regressors do
not appear in Sharpe and Ngyuen’s study, but may a priori aﬀect both the propensity to own
land, as well as the sensitivity of investment to local demand.
Table 2 presents the result of the regression of initial land holding on the various observables
we use. A quick inspection of the R2 suggests that industry dummies and ﬁrm size have the
largest explanatory power (10% of the cross sectional variance): obviously, supermarkets or
restaurant chains are more likely to own land than internet start-ups. The sign on the other
explanatory variables is quite surprising and appears at odds with what is found on US data in
Chaney et al. (2006). More precisely, we ﬁnd that more proﬁtable and more leveraged ﬁrms are
less likely to own their real estate properties. The correlation with ﬁrm leverage may simply
indicates that only low-leveraged ﬁrms have the ﬁnancial deepness necessary to acquire real
estate. A potential, though not deﬁnitive, explanation for the correlation between land holding
and ﬁrm performance may be that land holding increase asset size and that part of land holding
are owned for non-operating reasons (for savings for instance).
As already mentioned, we then construct the variable ABLAND1987,i which is simply deﬁned
as the residual of the estimation in column 3 of Table 2: a large ABLAND1987,i indicates that
ﬁrm i owns, in 1987, more land than what a ﬁrms with the same observable do.
We therefore use as our baseline regression the following modiﬁed version of equation 2:
∆(Inv)i,1992−1995 = α + βABLANDi,1987 + γIle de Francei,1992 (2)
+δABLANDi,1987 × Ile de France1992 + ν∆(Cash) + µXi + i,
Equation 3 is estimated in table 3. The ﬁrst two columns use the LAND1987 measure, i.e. the
1987 ratio of terrain to total asset, while the two last columns use the ABLAND1987 variable.
Column (1) and (3) control only for industry dummies and evolution of operating cash ﬂows,
while column (2) and (4) add control for the evolution of leverage and total sales. Table 3
presents strong, causal, evidence that land holding ﬁrms in Ile de Fance were strongly hit by the
sharp decline in real estate prices, relative to other ﬁrms (land holding ﬁrms in Province and non
land holding ﬁrms). For instance, using column (2) of table 3, we see that a ﬁrm with a 10 %
Land to Asset ratio in 1987 experienced between 1992 and 1995 a drop of .014 in its investment
ratio, relative to a ﬁrm with the same land holding in province: this represents more than 10%
of the standard deviation of the variation of investment. This eﬀect is thus both statistically
signiﬁcant as well as economically meaningful.
4The information on business group aﬃliation comes from a modiﬁed version of the LIFI ﬁles constructed by
Claude Picart
10When using the ABLAND1987 measure, we ﬁnd very similar coeﬃcients, but somewhat less
precisely estimated. This should not be surprising considering that this measure comes from the
residual of a ﬁrst estimation. Nevertheless, results are still signiﬁcant statistically, pointing out
to a causal, robust relationship between corporate investment and land value.
4 Real Estate Prices and Investment: Using Cross-Regional
Variability
4.1 Main Results
In this section, we departs from the natural experiment setting developed in section 3 to use a
softer identiﬁcation strategy similar to that exposed in Chaney et al. (2006).
In this section, we explore the consequence for corporate investment of variations in real estate
prices using “regular” inter-regional housing price variability. More precisely, we are looking for
the investment response in a 1 euro increase in local real estate prices. Our empirical procedure
still relies on a triple diﬀerence method: we compare ﬁrms in regions with and without land
price inﬂation, but within this set of ﬁrms, we further compare ﬁrms with and without land
holdings. Our empirical methodology thus relies on two diﬀerent identifying sources: (1) the
diﬀerence in investment behavior for ﬁrms facing the same real estate shocks, but with diﬀerent
level of land holding and (2) the diﬀerence in investment behavior of ﬁrms with the same level
of land holding but facing diﬀerent real estate shocks.
This strategy can be easily implemented by looking at a modiﬁed version of a classical in-










where INV is the ratio of investment to previous year capital stock, LAND is a the terrain to
asset ratio, P is the local real estate index and Cash is Operating Cash Flows normalized by
lagged book value of assets. Subscript t is for year t, subscript i is for ﬁrm i and superscript s
is for state s. We should stress the fact that we use one year lagged real estate prices instead
of contemporaneous ones in order to alleviate some of the endogeneity concerns that may arise
from doing so.
Our coeﬃcient of interest, δ, is identiﬁed by looking at the average elasticity of variation in
investment to variation in real estate prices for ﬁrms with positive land holding and comparing
it to the same elasticity for ﬁrms with no land holding, adjusting the elasticities for ﬁrms’ cash
ﬂows and market to book ratios. In order to check for the robustness of our results to the linear
speciﬁcation used in equation 3, we also use a dummy variable indicating positive terrain in
1987 as a measure for initial land holding.
As mentioned in the previous section and stressed in Chaney et al. (2006), it is highly
problematic to use the contemporaneous measure of land holding in estimating equation 3. We
therefore use the ABLAND1987 measure to address endogeneity issues, and therefore estimate









Because we use ﬁrm-ﬁxed eﬀects, we cannot identify the impact of ABLAND1987,i separately
from the ﬁxed eﬀect, which is why the β coeﬃcient of equation (3) is no longer present in equation
(4).
Table 4 reports various estimations of equation (4). Although we also include year dummies
in equation (4), the price index Ps
t remain identiﬁed because they are deﬁned at the state level.
Column 1 is just the standard investment equation, estimated on our sample; it simply assumes
that γ = δ = 0. The cash ﬂow variable comes out statistically very signiﬁcant, as in most studies.
Column 2 adds the LAND1987 variable and its interaction with real estate prices. Using directly
the value of a ﬁrm’s real estate also allows us to quantify the stringency of credit constraints.
We ﬁnd that an increase of a ﬁrm’s collateral value by ¿1 leads to an increase of investment
of 25 cents, other things equal. In other words, a one standard deviation increase in the price
index leads, for the average land holding company, to a 2.6% standard deviation increase in
investment. This magnitude may not appear very large, but it is important to keep in mind
that land holding accounts, for ﬁrms with positive land holding, for only 4% of their total assets.
Many other tangible assets are at the ﬁrm’s disposal, so that we cannot expect to explain an
important part of investment using only this speciﬁc type of collateral. Moreover, to give a
comparable order of magnitude, note that cash ﬂows, which has been traditionally considered as
an important determinant of investment only explains 13% of a standard deviation of investment
in our sample.
Table 4, column 3, replaces the LAND1987 continuous variable by a dummy variable indi-
cating 1987 positive land holding. We still ﬁnd a signiﬁcant and positive impact of real estate
prices on the investment behavior of ﬁrms. A one standard-deviation increase in housing prices
implies, for land holding ﬁrms, a 3% standard deviation increase in investment, relative to non
land holding corporations. This eﬀect is very close to the explanatory power obtained with the
LAND1987 variable, which indicates that our eﬀect is not primarily driven by the choice of a
continuous rather than a dummy variable.
Finally, Column 4 uses the abnormal land ownership variable constructed above (ABLAND1987)
as a measure of initial land holding, thus taking into account the fact that land owning ﬁrms
tend to be larger, less proﬁtable, less indebted and in particular industries. Again, the eﬀect
remains statistically signiﬁcant (at the 1% signiﬁcance level). Thus, our eﬀect is neither likely
to be driven by the omission of obvious correlates of land ownership.
One caveat with the estimates from columns 2-5 is that investment contains land purchase.
As a result, our strong coeﬃcients may simply reﬂect the fact that ﬁrms buy more land when
its price goes up, a recommendation expressed by several real estate practitioners (see Pomazal,
2001). In non reported regressions, we looked at the elasticity of land holdings to real estate
prices for land holding ﬁrms. We only found a slightly negative, and insigniﬁcant at the 15%
level, relation between real estate inﬂation and the change in land ownership at cost, controlling
for other investment determinants. The negative sign suggests that perhaps a fraction of the
ﬁrms with positive land holdings are realizing some capital gains and transform them into
12cash windfalls. But they are far from being representative. As another robustness check, we
ran “placebo” regressions. We replaced our ABLAND1987 variable by a random variable drawn
from a uniform distribution with the same support as the ABLAND1987 variable. In 20 diﬀerent
estimations (taking 20 diﬀerent draws of variable), the interaction between the placebo variable
and the price index was never found to be signiﬁcant, even at the 5% conﬁdence level.
4.2 Exposure to Local Demand Shocks
It could well be that shocks to real estate prices capture local demand shocks. Thus, an increase
in land prices will be correlated with ﬁrm investment, not because ﬁrms borrow against the new
collateral, but simply because they need to expand capacity to serve new demand. We deal with
such a “Keynesian accelerator” theory by comparing ﬁrms who own real estate to ﬁrms who do
not. Yet, it could be argued that land owning ﬁrms tend to be those ﬁrms that are typically the
most exposed to a local demand shock. For instance, local supermarket chains both own land and
are more sensitive to local consumption. On the contrary, software development ﬁrms neither
own land, nor are sensitive to local demand shocks. We deal partly with this criticism by using
our ABLAND1987 variable, whose aim is precisely to control for industry, capital intensity, or
even size. Yet, there may be some remaining unobserved heterogeneity in land ownership that
also explains exposure to local demand shocks.
Table 5 takes a ﬁrst step toward addressing this problem. In column 1, we add to our baseline
regression a direct control for local demand and interact this control with our land holding proxy,
ABLAND0. To measure local demand, we use the average taxable regional income available














t is average taxable income in year t in state s. As one can see from
column 1 of table 5, adding the controls for local activity to our baseline regression does not
change at all the estimates of our coeﬃcient of interest. In addition, real estate owning ﬁrms
do not behave diﬀerently in the wake of a demand shock: the coeﬃcient on the Local Income
interaction term is slightly positive, and not even signiﬁcant. This is quite comforting: at least
part of the variability in real estate inﬂation is orthogonal to the dynamics of local demand, and
still aﬀects ﬁrm investment. Moreover, this procedure may be judged too conservative, since the
dynamics of taxable income may capture part of the variability we need. For instance, a shock
to local demand is generally accompanied with a shock to real estate prices, which may aﬀect
corporate investment. Thus, by ﬁltering for local income, we may be too cautious. Columns 2
and 3 split the sample into manufacturing (column 2) and service (column 3) ﬁrms. The idea
behind this test is that manufacturing ﬁrms, given their ability to “export” out of state, must
be less sensitive to local demand shocks. Thus, if a “Keynesian accelerator” mechanism was at
work, we should ﬁnd a stronger relation with land value for service, than manufacturing ﬁrms.
A rapid glance at columns 2 and 3 conﬁrms it is not the case. The eﬀect is strongly signiﬁcant
for both manufacturing ﬁrms and service sector companies: both coeﬃcient are, moreover, not
13statistically diﬀerent from each other.
4.3 Group vs. Stand Alone Firms
The existence and eﬃciency of internal capital markets within business groups have been widely
discussed in the empirical ﬁnance literature (see Lamont (1997) or Lamont and Polk (2002)).
France is well known for its large number of business groups (see Thesmar (2001)). Our sample
is thus likely to contain a non trivial number of ﬁrms aﬃliated to a business group. If internal
capital markets are functioning within a group and that we are indeed identifying shocks to
collateral value, then these ﬁnancing shocks should be absorbed by the diﬀerent ﬁrms of a
group. In other words, the extra-ﬁnancing brought by increased collateral value should beneﬁt
all ﬁrms in a group, and especially those ﬁrms with the highest ﬁnancing need.
Empirically, this should be translated into a lower δ coeﬃcient for ﬁrms belonging to a group
than for stand-alone ﬁrms. This idea is tested in table 6, where we split the sample between
stand-alone and group aﬃliated ﬁrms. The results are striking. All the eﬀect we pointed out
in the previous sections is concentrated among stand-alone ﬁrms. On the one hand, the eﬀect
of an increase in land holding prices becomes very close to 0 for land holding ﬁrms aﬃliated
to a group. On the other hand, the estimation of δ for stand-alone ﬁrms goes up to .39 which
has to be compared to the .24 estimated in column 4 of table 4. Focusing on stand-alone
ﬁrms therefore more than doubles the explanatory power of land holding value on corporate
investment. It comforts us in believing that we are indeed identifying a ﬁnancing shock. It also
is of interest for ﬁnancial economists as it provides them with another test of internal capital
markets’ eﬃciency.
5 Capital Structure
In this section, we try to explore the channel through which ﬁrms are able to convert the
increased value on their land holdings into further investment. The empirical methodology we
use is similar to the one in section 4: we simply change the dependent variable (investment)
with capital structure variables and investigate which part of the capital structure is aﬀected by
changes in real estate market conditions.
As we saw in section 4.2, ﬁrms, when confronted with an increase in the value of their land
holdings, do not sell their real estate properties. It means that outside ﬁnancing must increase
in order to explain the observed increase in investment. One clear candidate at this stage is
the issue of new debt, secured on the incremental value of land holdings. If new investment
is entirely ﬁnanced with new debt, the book value of leverage should be increasing. Such an
increase would be consistent with most theories of capital structure. For instance, an increase
in the value of land holding does, a priori, reduce costs of ﬁnancial distress, as land is a fairly
liquid asset. Under trade-oﬀ theory, this encourages ﬁrms to take on more debt as a fraction of
total assets, possibly as much as the size of the new investment. Both market and book leverage
increase under trade-oﬀ. Under pecking order, the ﬁrms seeks to ﬁnance new investment with
the least information sensitive security. A capital gain has the eﬀect of allowing the ﬁrm to issue
information insensitive secured loans. Such loans are less expansive than non secured loans or
14equity, their new availability makes some investment project proﬁtable. Thus, under pecking
order as well as under trade-oﬀ, capital gains should lead to more debt and more leverage.
Table 7 reports results of the eﬀect of an increase in land value on capital structure variables,
for stand-alone ﬁrms. We focus our attention on stand-alone ﬁrms as we know from section 4.3
that group aﬃliated ﬁrms are not aﬀected by collateral shocks. In column 2, we look at ﬁnancial
leverage deﬁned as ﬁnancial debt normalized by lagged value of assets. Book leverage responds
positively to an increase in land value, suggesting that ﬁrms use the increased value of land
holding to boost their debt capacity and ﬁnance incremental investment. The point estimate
is higher than the one obtained using investment as a dependent variable (Table 4, column 4),
which suggests that the debt issued on the increased land value does not only serve to ﬁnance
incremental investment.
A natural question stemming from this result is then to know whether ﬁrms facing increasing
land value issue debt more frequently or make larger debt issuance when issuing. The answer
to this question is presented in columns 3 and 4 of table 7. We see there that an increase in
collateral value increase signiﬁcantly the amount of debt issue, when issuing debt, but does not
aﬀect the probability of issuing debt. To give an order of magnitude, we ﬁnd that a one euro
increase in collateral leads land holding ﬁrms to a 78 cents larger debt issuance, conditionally
on issuing debt. These results are consistent with the view of credit constraint binding not on
the access to ﬁnancing but on the extent of funds obtained. This is somewhat intuitive as most
project are, by nature, scalable.
That debt strongly reacts to variations in collateral value is conﬁrmed by column 1 of table 7.
This column report the result of an estimation of equation 3, where the dependent variable is the
evolution of ﬁnancial leverage instead of the evolution of corporate investment. Land holding
ﬁrms located in Ile de France confronted with the bust of the real estate bubble experienced a
sharp decline in their ﬁnancial leverage ratio, compare to land holding ﬁrms in province and to
non land holding ﬁrms in France.
We ﬁnally look in column 5 of table 7 at the evolution of ﬁrms’ interest rate. An important
issue is that we only have a very crude measure of interest rate, namely the average interest
rate measured as total ﬁnancial expenses normalized by ﬁnancial debts. As it turns out, we do
ﬁnd in column 5 a decrease in interest rate, which could be consistent with the debt being more
secured on land holdings, but this decrease is far from being signiﬁcant. A ﬁrst interpretation
could simply be that our measure of interest rate is too noisy to capture any eﬀect. Another
interpretation would push the idea that ﬁrms are using the increase in land value to ﬁnance riskier
additional project, so that at equilibrium the decrease in risk brought by increased collateral
value is neutralized by the increase in projects’ risk.
6 Conclusion
The result presented in this paper for France are very similar to the one we point in our com-
panion paper in the US (Chaney et al. (2006)). Variations in tangible assets’ value have, when
these assets are present on a ﬁrm’s balance sheet, a signiﬁcant impact on (1) the ﬁnancing ﬁrms
obtain and (2) the investments they undertake. Moreover, these results are mostly concentrated
15for stand-alone companies, as opposed to business groups. Taken together, these results suggest
that stand-alone French companies have been aﬀected by important credit constraints in the
90s, part of which were triggered by the real estate crisis.
As we already noted in Chaney et al. (2006), an important implication of our analysis is
normative. As positive shocks to land value alleviate ﬁnancing constraints, holding real estate
in the balance sheet may act as an eﬃcient hedging tool against liquidity shocks in the future.
Following up on Holmstrom and Tirole (2000,2001) analysis of liquidity, we advocate that ﬁrms
with liquidity needs independent of the real estate market should beneﬁt more from holding land.
Thus, the decision to rent or buy real estate property should integrate this hedging motive.
Most importantly, the present paper opens up many leads for further research. We insist
strongly on two of these leads.
First, we have seen that collateral did not seem to impact ﬁnancing decisions in group aﬃliated
ﬁrms. This seems to indicate that internal capital markets are indeed functioning within these
groups. An interesting question would be to look more precisely into these groups and determine
according to organizational variables which groups have eﬃcient internal capital markets.
Second, we have mainly exhibited what looks like a ﬁnancing shock and we have shown that
this ﬁnancing shock lead to decreased investment. A nice feature of the BRN ﬁle is that it can
be merged, at least on the 1986-1992 period, with precise exhaustive data on ﬁrms export and
import behavior (see Eaton et al. (2004) for a detailed review of these data). We could thus
investigate the link between credit constraints and export behavior, an important question in
international economics, explored theoretically in Chaney (2005), but which has received few
empirical answer at the moment. This question ranks high on our research agenda.
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21B Tables
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
Price Index 119,420 1.31 1.24 .25 .98 2.06
Log(Assets) 143,700 9.29 9.09 1.66 0 18.74
ROA 142,929 .082 .078 .084 -.35 .51
Interest Rate 130,720 .15 .11 .13 -.10 .89
Total Leverage 143,609 .49 .49 .20 0 2.09
Financial Leverage 140,387 .43 .30 .45 -.02 2.7
Investment 140,400 .11 .072 .118 -.53 .705
Group Dummy 143,700 .23 0 .42 0 1
Land Holding 11,959 .017 0 .03 0 .11
LAND HOLDING 11,975 .495 0 .5 0 1
ABLAND1987 139,308 -.002 -.009 .024 -.06 .088
Issuance Probability 143,700 .42 0 .49 0 1
Debt Issuance 57,955 .137 .085 .149 .0007 .81
Cash Flows 139,100 .23 .18 .30 -1.22 1.59
Notes: This table reports summary statistics for the main variables used in the paper. These variables
are: Log(Assets), ROA (EBITDA/Asset), Total Leverage (Total Debt/Asset), Financial Leverage (Total
Debt/Asset), Cash Flows (EBITDA-Dividends)/Asset), Investment (Investment normalized by Asset),
Group Dummy (a dummy indicating whether the ﬁrms is aﬃliated to a business group), Issuance Prob-
ability (probability of any debt issuance), Debt Issuance (Issues of new debt normalized by Asset –
conditional on debt issuance) Land Holding (Land Holding normalized by Asset) - this variable is deﬁned
for the year 1987- and LAND HOLDING, a dummy variable indicating whether a ﬁrm has positive land
holding in 1987.
22Table 2: Explaining Initial Real Estate Ownership
1987 Land Holding
(1) (2) (3)








Region Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 11,926 11,866 11,866
R2 .11 .11 .11
Notes: This table investigates ﬁrms’ initial real estate holding. The dependent variable is initial land
holding deﬁned as the ratio of land to total assets in 1987. The explanatory variables are: Log(Assets),
ROA, Leverage, a dummy variable indicating whether the ﬁrm belongs to a group, industry dummies (at
the 2 digit level), year dummies and Region Dummies. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ means statistically diﬀerent from
zero at 10, 5 and 1% level of signiﬁcance.
23Table 3: Real Estate Prices and Investment Behavior : The Bust of Paris real estate Bubble
(1992-1995)
∆(Capital Expenditure)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ile de France -.004 -.0035 -.0065*** -.0055**
(.0025) (.0027) (.002) (.0022)
LAND1987 .0072 -.024
(.049) (.041)




ABLAND1987×Ile de France -.16** -.14**
(.06) (.052)
∆(Cash) .04*** .014*** .039*** .013**





Industry Fixed Eﬀect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 10,910 10,407 10,633 10,143
R2 .019 .091 .02 .091
Notes: This table investigates the long term impact of real estate inﬂation in the Ile de France Region
on corporate investment, according to equation 3. Dependent variable is the diﬀerence in the ratio of
capital expenditure to lagged book value of assets between 1992 and 1995. Column (1) and (2) use the
LAND1987 variable as a measure of initial land holding, while column (3) and (4) use the ABLAND1987
measure. Column (1) and (3) controls for the diﬀerence in Cash, while column (2) and (4) add controls
for diﬀerences in Total Leverage and diﬀerences in Ln(Sales). All speciﬁcation include year ﬁxed eﬀect.
Observations are clustered at the Region-Year level. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗ means statistically diﬀerent from zero
at 10, 5 and 1% level of signiﬁcance.
24Table 4: Real Estate Prices and Investment Behavior - General Speciﬁcation
Capital Expenditure
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Price Index -.0028 -.0022 .0013
(.0021) (.0023) (.0021)
LAND1987× Price Index .26***
(.047)




Cash .053*** .054*** .054*** .054***
(.0017) (.0026) (.0026) (.0026)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Eﬀect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 136,460 112,991 110,185 110,185
R2 .28 .3 .3 .3
Notes: This table investigates the impact of real estate price variations on corporate investment behavior.
Dependent variable is capital expenditure normalized by lagged book value of assets. Column 1 estimates
a simple investment to cash ﬂow equation, using EBITDA less dividends normalized by lagged book value
of asset as a measure for cash ﬂows. Column (2), (3) and (4) present estimations of equation 4, using
respectively LAND1987, a dummy indicating positive terrain in 1987 and ABLAND1987 as a measure of
initial land holding. All speciﬁcation include year as well as ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀect and cluster observations
at the state-year level. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗ means statistically diﬀerent from zero at 10, 5 and 1% level of
signiﬁcance.
25Table 5: Real Estate Prices and Investment Behavior - Robustness Checks
Capital Expenditure
(1) (2) (3)
Price Index .00081 -.0038 .016***
(.0022) (.0037) (.0043)




ABLAND1987× Local Income .12
(.15)
Cash .054*** .068*** .038***
(.0026) (.0033) (.0027)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Eﬀect Yes Yes Yes
Observations 110,185 53,951 46,483
R2 .3 .29 .33
Notes: This table presents three robustness checks of the estimation made in table 4. Dependent variable
is capital expenditure normalized by lagged book value of assets. Column 1 estimates equation 5, where
a control for local income, the average taxable income in the region, is added and interacted with the
ABLAND1987 variable. Column 2 and 3 estimates our interest equation for manufacturing and non
manufacturing ﬁrms, respectively. All speciﬁcation use year as well as ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀect. All estimation
cluster observations at the region-year level. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗ means statistically diﬀerent from zero at 10, 5
and 1% level of signiﬁcance.





Price Index .0044 -.0012
(.0038) (.0027)




Year Dummies Yes Yes




Notes: This table estimates equation 5 for ﬁrms aﬃliated to group and stand-alone ﬁrms, respectively.
The variables used are similar to those deﬁned in table 4. All speciﬁcation include year as well as ﬁrm ﬁxed
eﬀect and cluster observations at the region-year estate ownership level. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗ means statistically
diﬀerent from zero at the 10, 5 and 1% level of signiﬁcance.
27Table 7: Real Estate Prices and Capital Structure
∆(Leverage) Financial Debt Probability of Interest
Leverage Issuance of Issuance Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)




ABLAND1987×Ile de France -.30**
(.14)
Price Index .017* .013** -.0072 -.0005
(.0095) (.0065) (.013) (.0027)
ABLAND1987× Price Index .68** .78*** -.055 -.04
(.34) (.26) (.31) (.13)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Eﬀect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 11,013 72,222 30,112 73,540 66,955
R2 .008 .66 .4 .36 .51
Notes: This table investigates the link between land Prices and Capital Structure decisions. Column (1)
use the same speciﬁcation as column (3) of table 3, i.e. looks at long term variation in ﬁnancial leverage
in Ile de France vs. other regions, for land and non land holding ﬁrms. Column (2), (3), (4) and (5)
estimates equation 4 using, respectively, ﬁnancial leverage (ﬁnancial debts normalized by lagged book
value of assets), Debt Issuance (Debt issued normalized by lagged book value of assets, conditionnal on
debt issuance), Probability of Debt Issuance and Average Interest Rate (measured as ﬁnancial expenses
normalized by ﬁnancial debt). All speciﬁcation include year as well as ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀect and cluster
observations at the region-year level. The sample is restricted to Stand-Alone ﬁrms. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗ means
statistically diﬀerent from zero at 10, 5 and 1% level of signiﬁcance.
28